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Abstract 
Firm Innovation in Asia-Pacific Region: The Role of Governance Environment, Firm 
Characteristics, and External Finance  
 
           This study shines a light on factors that affect innovation activities across seven countries 
in East Asia and Pacific region for the year of 2015. The study investigates the impact of 
governance environment, firm characteristics, and external finance on innovation of 4993 firms 
from Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippine, Vietnam, Timor Leste, Solomon Islands, and Papua New 
Guinea. The World Bank enterprise survey has been employed as the data source, I take cross 
sectional data includes public and private firms, large and SMEs in these countries. This paper 
defines three aspects of firm innovation, core innovation that refers to introducing or developing 
new product and/or services, innovation activities which include R&D spending, licensing 
inventions, international quality certificate, licensing new technology from foreign companies, 
and conducting in innovation training. The third aspect is related to the effectiveness of 
innovation new outputs whether they have new functions, better quality, new automation, or 
new process technology. I find that individual firm characteristics are strongly correlated to firm 
innovation. I also provide new evidence to the positive relationship between corruption and 
innovation as well as the preference of external finance to the internal finance in the context of 
firm innovation.       
Key words 
Innovation, governance, firm characteristics, external finance 
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Chapter one: introduction 
1.1 overview 
An Innovation is one of the most important pillars of economic growth in any country. 
So, many governments seek to increase the growth rates of innovative activities, either by 
supporting local companies or through cooperation and partnership with foreign companies 
(Erdal & Göçer, 2015). Nowadays, there’s so much speak about innovation, (Braden, n.d.) 
defines Innovation as creating something so worthy, widely adopted, and that replacing the 
prevailed solution in most of appropriate use cases. But, although (Poston, 2017) suggested new 
innovation measurements such as expected commercial value, development cycle time, and 
forecast degradation, in this study, the firm innovation refers mainly to firms’ ability to 
introduce or develop new products or processes as well as create R&D outputs and patents. 
The recent insights from the top industry influencers in Asia Pacific region believe that 
latest technology, motivated entrepreneurs, and innovation boosted the region's market to offer 
an array of opportunities for accelerated growth. the fastest growing innovation in APAC region 
attracts MNCs and international entrepreneurs to invest in the most innovative sectors of new 
software and services such as digital banking, cloud services market, internet of things.(Cohen, 
2017). 
Firm’s innovation is affected by a variety of factors, governance environment either 
external governance like legal system and corruption or internal corporate governance 
mechanisms like ownership structure and external audit. firm characteristics such as size, age, 
competition, and legal status also are drivers of innovation in these firms as well. In addition, 
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external finance plays a significant role in determining the innovation levels in small and large 
companies. This study provides a particular emphasis on topics are relatively studied in the 
literatures which are the impact of governance environment, firm characteristics, and finance 
method on innovation. Therefore, this study tries to answer the following questions: 
1. Does governance environment affect firm innovation? If so, to what extend firms in East 
Asia and pacific region can practice innovation in scope of legal institutions and corruption 
constraints? Are innovative firms in this region victims of corruption?  
2. Are foreign-owned firms more or less innovative than other ﬁrms owned by domestic 
private firms? Is state ownership in East Asia and Pacific countries correlated with lower 
ﬁrm innovation rates? 
3. Which firm characteristics, e.g. legal status, size, age, trade, training, and competition, are 
associated with firm innovation capability?  
4.  How does access to external finance and internal finance affect firm innovation activities in 
East Asia and Pacific countries? And to what extend channels of external finance are 
different in their impact on firm innovation? 
           To give answers for these questions, across seven countries, I use a large set of firm level 
data from the World Bank enterprise survey for the year 2015. The ES dataset includes a 
diversity of questions regarding individual and general business environment in which firms 
work. By using several econometrics models and tests, this paper examined the relationship 
between a diversity of innovation aspects and governance environment, firm characteristics, and 
external finance channels.  
          When we look at governance environment, this study provides no evidence of causal 
relationship between strong court system and firm innovation, hence firms in East Asia and 
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Pacific countries can practice innovation regardless of the degree to which legal system is partial 
or uncorrupted. Additionally, these firms are victims of bribes and they are compelled to make 
informal payments to avoid the bureaucracy and foster their innovation activities. 
This paper also find that larger firms are more innovative than SMEs. firms classified as 
shareholding are more likely to invest in innovation activities without any preference over other 
legal statues in term of innovating new products and processes. moreover, firms located in the 
official capital city are more innovative. Furthermore, the more innovative firms are exporting 
ones with less than 10 competitors for the main product, they also compete strongly against 
informal sector and they have worldwide marketing networks with no limited to domestic and 
national markets.  
This study provides new evidence to the literature in term of access to external finance 
and its significant contribution in firm innovation comparing to internal finance such as retained 
earnings. But, results regarding the channels through which external finance might be the driver 
of innovation are somewhat different, I find that firms rely on external funds from non-banking 
system to finance their operation are more innovative than those who are heavily dependent on 
banks. Furthermore, firms that use informal finance such as friends or families can innovate as 
well despite the negative impact of such finance channel on their productivity and performance. 
Results show new evidence to the positive correlation between access to external finance 
and firm innovation comparing to internal finance such as retained earnings. But, results 
regarding the channels through which external finance might be the driver of innovation are 
somewhat different, firms rely on external funds from non-banking system to finance their 
operation are more innovative than those who are heavily dependent on banks. Furthermore, 
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firms that use informal finance such as friends or families can innovate as well despite the 
negative impact of such finance channel on their productivity and performance. 
This topic gains its importance from the globally increasingly attention paid to innovation 
and how policy makers can adopt national innovation strategies with business environment. Also, 
Today’s competitive environment presents difficult challenges for firm innovation. thus, both 
SMEs and large firms are in a real need for good governance practices and best finance strategies 
that together sort out and move forward strategic innovation activities.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
1.2.1 Governance environment  
          The governance environment affects the firm growth and performance, it is derived from 
power of institutions and institutional trust, corruption and transparency, and firm ownership 
and governance. We can define the trust in institutions as a vital aspect of fostering governance 
and nurturing development. it is relatively linked with positive consequences of economic 
growth and government performance. To illustrate, the concept of institutional trust measures 
the society’s trust in public organizations, rules and legislations, and enforcement mechanisms 
(World Bank, 2017) This trust includes all mechanisms that arrange the human’s needs in the 
community such as political, economic, legal, and educational systems. 
          Confidence level in the legal system across almost countries has been diminishing 
gradually due to the deteriorating performance of the justice scheme (Walle, 2009). according to 
Gallup continually survey conducted in 123 countries in 2013, slightly more than half of adults 
across these countries expressed their confidence in the judicial systems and courts. residents of 
73 of these surveyed countries, the residents confident in their country's judicial system and 
courts did not exceed (50%). however, Regionally, the survey referred to the highest level of 
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trust in the rule of law in Asia comparing with other regions, where nearly (65%) of Asians 
expressed faith in their legal systems and courts, but in Latin America this rate was (35%), 
Europe (49%), Sub-Saharan Africa (48%), Middle East and Northern Africa (47%), Northern 
America (47%), and the countries of the former Soviet Union (28%) which was among the 
lowest in the globe. furthermore, in Asian countries, the survey showed the percentage of trust 
in Malaysia (70%), Indonesia (53%), Philippine (61%), and Vietnam (66%) (Rochelle & 
Loschky, 2014).  
           Bribes and corruption are real threats to economic growth and development as well as 
institutional effectiveness. OECD defined corruption as “An active or a passive misuse of the 
powers of Public officials (appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits”. bribing 
of government officials, is one of the fundamental forms of corruption. An offence, commonly 
defined by Legal scholars as the action of "giving, offering, promising, taking, or agreeing to 
take money or other consideration in order to improperly influence a public official’s actions” 
(Boles, 2014).  
        The question "how economic activity is affected by corruption?" remains a controversial 
issue in the theoretical and empirical literatures, (Svensson, 2005) argued that corruption curbs 
entrepreneurship activities and firm investment, hampers the ability of firms to access fit 
finance, and increases the transaction costs. Thus, hampers economic growth. while, (Hsieh & 
Klenow, 2009; Dal B o´ and Rossi, 2007) argued that corruption causes resource misallocation 
within firms. Moreover, by using market capitalization as a measure of firms' benefits, (Cheung 
et al, 2012) found no positive correlation among paying bribes, either in foreign countries or 
bribing higher ranking public officials and receiving larger benefits. 
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            By contrast, (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013) argued that corruption may act efficiently in 
bureaucratic regimes, it could reduce the costs of doing new businesses and improve the entire 
performance. furthermore, (Weaver, 2016) referred to potentially leading to effective allocation 
methods of resources, where the most productive and innovative firms may have more 
incentives to pay. In addition, some new evidence from Brazil is shown in the study of 
(Colonnelli & Prem, 2018) which confirmed that the corrupt firms have better performance 
from similar group of unaffected firms. Corrupt firms characterized by higher levels of 
investments, better access to finance, effective labor reallocation inside the firm, better 
reengineering of entire structure and transactions by rising the hierarchical layers, less reliance 
on government contracts, and faster growth. 
1.2.2 Business Environment  
              Innovation strategies vary between firms according the kind of innovation rather than 
the decision whether the firm is going to be innovative or not, or the investment spent in 
innovation activities. The reason behind such theory is that the firms' priority in cost reduction 
due to high competition or developing existed products to face declining demand. in addition, 
firms may need to restructure or reengineer practices and sometimes firms prefer to avoid 
innovation activities at all and that in case of primary markets stability or when the potential 
innovative technological and organizational activities are limited (Schubert, 2010).  
           The characteristics of local firms and their environment which are highly various within 
national boundaries play an important role in fostering technological knowledge and developing 
innovative capabilities.  these characteristics – such as ownership structure and legal status, firm 
size, firm age, trading and competition capability or the firm s´ R&D capacity and formal 
training – and the implementation of different types of innovation remain relatively unclear 
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from prior evaluation research. In this section I shine a light on a conceptual framework for the 
empirical analysis to set apart such firm drivers of innovation. 
           The OECD’ innovation framework1 confirmed that the efficiency of resources allocation 
within firms could be achieved by fiscal discipline and law. When output growth has strong and 
stable rates, firms will have incentives to introduce new products and processes or undertake 
some considerable organizational changes. Also, as a result of this work, as long as the 
competition is strong and supported by policy makers alongside encouraging open trade and 
reducing barriers, firms increase their investment towards innovative activities. 
          Realizing the behavioral additionalities are significantly affected by R&D linked firm 
characteristics. Research found that these behavioral additionalities in firms with high R&D 
inputs are less likely to be substantiated, while such additionalities are more likely to be realized 
in small and young firms and those specialized in technology. therefore, attention of 
government support for direct R&D promotion should be shifted from firms with high R&D 
resources - at which such promotion might be misallocated - to lower R&D experience firms 
such as SMEs and startups, see (Wanzenb o¨ck, I & Scherngell, Thomas & Fischer, 2013)  
          The argument about the relationship among firm's size and exploitation of innovation 
began when (Schumpeter, 1942) presented his theory, the incentive and ability for spending on 
R&D are greater in large firms than small ones, thus we may consider larger firms the major 
driver of economic growth. This influential economist supports his argument by considering the 
market power of larger firms as one of the main engine of economic growth because they have 
more resources needed to catalyze technological change. additionally, their fixed cost per 
innovation could be amortized over a variety of units. consequently, the benefits of innovation 
                                            
1
 OECD (2015), "The business environment for innovation", in The Innovation Imperative: Contributing to Productivity, Growth 
and Well-Being, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239814-6-en 
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should be less in small firms. However, the counter argument suggesting small firms have 
higher productivity with their R&D due to their reliance on governance advantages. small 
number of employees reveal that decision makers within firms are closer to the technology 
activities and to the customers, accordingly they can easily adopt technological possibilities 
with market needs see (Allen, 1977). But, reconciling the coexistence of both viewpoints has 
been presented in more recent studies that suggest both larger and smaller firms vary in the sort 
of R&D conducted by them, incremental innovation vs radical innovation or process innovation 
vs product innovation, and the returns to each type differ with firm size as well, see (Rosen, 
1991);(Cohen & Klepper, 1996); (Knott, 2003); (Anne Marie Knott & Vieregger, 2015) 
          Ownership structure and legal status of firms are from the main factors of firm innovation 
capacity. The issue of government ownership in firms is crucial for innovation, ( Zhou & Gao & 
Zhao, 2016) believe that even though the state ownership in firms enables them to obtain 
important R&D resources, it makes them less efficient in employing acquired resources to 
generate product or process innovation, thus less state ownership in the firms could be most 
favorable structure for introducing innovation outputs. Also, (Majumdar, 2008) found that 
relative shrinking of state ownership in Indian industrial firms associated with a significant 
growth in industrial performance. Another issue related to foreign ownership, the debate is 
whether local firms owned by foreigners could achieve satisfied level of innovation. Quite 
early, theories alongside empirical research acknowledged FDI as a possible channel for 
technology transfer and innovation. Some research concluded that FDI inflows have positive 
impact on R&D expenditures and innovation outputs in host countries, see (Javorcik, 2004), 
(Moran, 2006), (Erdal & Göçer, 2015b), (Sekuloska, 2015) (Cheung & Lin, 2004). from the 
other side, other studies found negative spillover effects of FDI on patents and other innovation 
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activities, see(Wancio, 2015), (Qu, 2014), (Jaguli, 2011) (Sourafel Girma, Gong, & Görg, 
2006). 
            In recent years, much debate has been risen regarding financing innovation particularly 
in small firms, where such firms sometimes lack from solvency or have another kind of 
financial constraints that limit their access to external finance. (Agénor, Canuto, & Jelenic, 
2014) referred to key factors of these financial constraints, the first one is limited collateral 
because assets acquired by companies engaging in innovation are fundamentally intangible. the 
second is the asymmetry of information among firms conducting in R&D activities and the 
potential finance providers. The third is high monitoring costs which make external investments 
in R&D activities less attractive than other probable investment strategies like public subsidies 
or internal finance.  
            All the previous issues and arguments gain their importance from the globally 
increasingly innovation effect on economic growth as well as the attention paid to governance 
and business environment at the same time. In this study, I will investigate empirically these 
arguments and theories by testing regression models and other statistical and quantitative 
correlation to contribute to the research efforts in innovation and development policy making. 
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Chapter two 
2. Prior studies 
        The innovation act in governance environment has been studied partially in the literatures, 
the study of (Yang, 2017) used the same data source of our study which is the World Bank 
enterprise survey, it investigated the association among governance environment and SMEs 
performance in 14 Latin America and the Caribbean countries by explaining differences between 
innovative firms and non-innovative ones. The study found a correlation between poor 
environment and operation performance, it is related to lower profitability and lower sales size 
for innovative SME than non-innovative. The study confirmed that when court system is 
apparent to be strong, innovator firms tend to achieve higher sales and profits. By contract, 
differently, the performance of large innovative and noninnovative firm is not affected by 
governance environment. bribes have impact on firms’ performance as well, by using the 
instrumental variables method on cross-sectional data and some evidence from panel data. 
(Şeker & Yang, 2014) referred to the negative effect of briberies on firm growth in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region particularly low-sales-generating and startup firms. The annual 
sales growth of firms that were asked to pay bribes for government officials was lower than firms 
that had not face such solicitations. Using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys data set for 25,000 
companies in 57 countries (Ayyagari, Demirguc-kunt, & Maksimovic, 2010) investigated the 
influential association between corruption and tax evasion on innovation activities for these firms 
at their firm-level determinants, a large portion of which are SMEs in developing countries and 
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they are victimized of corruption. The study found that Innovative firms pay a larger fraction of 
their sales in bribes to government officials than non-innovative firms. But, the point is that no 
relation among paying bribes and receiving better services from the government. Also, firms that 
commit to bribes avoid paying more taxes.  
  Furthermore, by employing longitudinal data from 64 countries, (Anokhin & Schulze, 
2009) found negative correlation between corruption and trust level in the state and market 
institutions where the transaction costs that can restrain firm productivity and innovation are 
risen by the absence of such trust. Moreover, in the context of firm governance and ownership 
structure, (Benassi & Landoni, 2017) discussed the argument about the overtaking of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to their specific value chains either in access innovative technologies, 
obtain technical capabilities, or introduce innovative products and processes exactly because 
their tasks are to a large scope wide and their assignment challenging. They found that SOEs 
play an important role in innovation, thus considering the state as a recombinator of knowledge 
through decentralized structures. (Gubitta & Gianecchini, 2002) investigated the effect of non-
family management on governance structure for 83 SMEs in Northeast Italy and presented a 
definition of flexibility of the firm governance model. They said that if the owner manages of 
businesses are not intricate or complex to manage, the governance structure is pointless. Another 
point, (Munari & Oriani &  Sobrero, 2010)  tested data of 1000 firms from six European 
countries and found that R&D investment is lower in case of higher shareholding by families and 
financial institutions. In addition, an executive remuneration system that is linked to the firm’s 
financial performance has a strong negative impact on R&D. thus suggesting the presence of a 
greater pressure for the sake of reducing R&D in market-based governance systems.  (Tan & 
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Tan, 2004) argued that corporate governance codes do have their implications for SMEs and they 
do help in value creation of entrepreneurial firms.  
           (Abor & Adjasi, 2007) and (Rachagan & Satkunasingam, 2009) stated that the existence of 
independent and non-executive external board members such as audit committee members could 
lead to better management decisions and help growing entrepreneurial firms as well as to obtain 
more resources and attract additional funding from investors. Also, (Seifert, Gonenc, & Wright, 
2005) found that BOD diversity in SMEs ownership proportion can cause the agency costs to go 
down, hence increase firm performance. (Shapiro, Tang, Wang, & Zhang, 2013) concluded that 
corporate governance and ownership affect innovation activity when measured by patenting 
activity, but not when measured by new product sales. (Che Haat, Zulkafli & Rabi, 2010) found 
that board compensation and frequency of board meeting are considered as important 
characteristics that would determine the effectiveness of the innovation investment.  
             There is some empirical literature establishing the importance of Firm characteristics in 
progressing firm level and regional innovation. For instance, firms’ investment in R&D, (Frenkel, 
Shefer,  Koschatzky,& Walter, 2010) concluded that expenditure on R&D is a motivative driver for 
innovative factories in Germany among all ones in the same sector, regardless of the manufacturing 
branch to which the factories belong, thus the share of firms that spend on R&D such as the high-
tech industries is significantly greater than in the traditional industries. (Lu, Tsang, & Peng, 2008) 
investigated the association among R&D and innovation in Asia Pacific firms and stated that future 
R&D derived from strong institutional environment view has considerable potential to accelerate 
and advance our grasp of knowledge management besides innovation strategy. 
             Exporting and importing characteristic is a driver of innovation and growth as well, by 
using firm level data from World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys for 43 countries, (Şeker, 2011) 
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investigated the association between firm growth (innovation is an indirect measure of firm growth) 
and firm's trade orientation and that by dividing the firms into four categories: only exporters, only 
importers, two-way traders, and non-traders. the study showed that there is a significant correlation 
among global engagement of firms and their productivity, capital intensity, and wages rate. it also 
found that two-way trader firms (exporter and importer) grow faster and have more innovation than 
other groups. additionally, the best performer firm among those are that import intermediate 
products.  
               The relation between market influence and innovation has been a frequent question, 
(Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, & Prantl, 2009)  concluded that the market competition 
intensity, measured by new entry into certain industries, is positively associated with innovation 
activities between incumbent companies that employ advanced technology and negatively linked 
with those less efﬁcient incumbents. (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2011) found a 
positive correlation between competition with foreign firms and higher innovation rates. however, 
no relationship has been found among competition with state-owned firms and ﬁrm innovation 
levels. in addition, the study concluded that exporter firms are more innovative than non-exporter 
ones. 
              The nature of correlation between Innovation, firm size, and firm age is a theory that has 
been attempted in the range of literatures, (Hansen, 1992) assessed the impact of both firm size and 
firm age on innovation levels of manufacturing firms. the study used new products introduced and 
fraction of the last 5 years sales from these new products as indicators of innovation outputs. the 
results showed that firm age and firm size can work separately in assessing the firm innovation 
level as well as both size and age inversely linked to innovation outputs. also, (Balasubramanian & 
Lee, 2008) by using patents data from COMPUSTAT firms and found negative correlation between 
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firm age and technical quality, especially greater in areas with more active technology. moreover, 
with each further year there is a reduction in the influence of 10% of growth in R&D concentration 
by just over 3% on the market value. 
               Investment in human capital for innovation has been studied in previous research such as 
the paper of (Macdonald, Assimakopoulos, & Anderson, 2007) which found a positive impact of 
education and training on desired innovation in some European firms. Furthermore, 
(Bauernschuster, Falck, & Heblich, 2009) argued that continuous training for firms' staff lead to an 
increase in leading‐ edge knowledge which raise a firm’s tendency to innovate new products and 
processes. the paper of (Acemoglu, 1997) confirmed that in case of high workers' expectations 
about potential firms' innovation, they will be more motivated to invest in their individual skills and 
accepting the prevailed lower wages rates if they expect higher wages rates in the future. in a 
similar way, the willingness of firms to innovate is related positively with their expectations about 
higher quality of workforce in the future. 
            Given the importance of innovation for firm growth, it is more serious for readers to ask 
whether ﬁnancial development is correlated to growth by fostering ﬁrm innovation and thus 
increasing efﬁciency in Asian Pacific firms. (Girma, Gong, & Gorg, 2008) suggested that FDI 
financed firms and domestic bank financed firms tend to innovate more than others. Additionally, 
FDI inwards are positively correlated with domestic R&D activities at the sectoral level. however, 
the effect of FDI into technology transfer is distinguished from the impact on indigenous credit 
opportunities. However, (M. S. Freel, 2000) found that no indicators of success in innovation in 
case of applying for external finance by innovative firms. thus, innovators are less likely to apply 
for such finance than other less innovative peers. (Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005) investigated the 
SMEs behavior in Finland and provides evidence that innovation and growth could be curbed by 
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capital market limitations as well as the government funding disproportionately helps firms from 
industries that heavily rely on external finance.  
           Although financing the R&D activities provides a potentially earnest channel to relate 
finance with innovation outputs and economic growth, (Fazzari, 2009) found that there are no 
direct evidences that aggregate R&D activities in U.S. firms are affected largely and enough by 
finance choice. in addition, the study found significant influence of internal cash flows and external 
equity in young firms, but not in mature ones.(Freel, 1999) explored the environment of funding 
product innovative firms in UK and concluded, whilst innovative firms had no desire to search the 
needed external funds, they had less chances to have successfully accessed bank loans. This could 
be a kind of seriousness since bank loans is still considered the key source of external finance 
utilized. (Giudici & Paleari, 2000) tested the innovation finance in 46 small high-tech Italian firms. 
they confirmed an inadequacy of traditional financial methods for financing innovative projects 
such as personal finance and short-term bank loans. thus, they are willing to issue external equity 
only if the new investors also provide non-financial competencies. 
             Venture capital industry as a finance choice has a significant impact on firm performance 
and growth. there have been a growing number of studies discussing innovation in venture capital-
backed SMEs and other firms over the past decades, (Gonzalez, 2013) believe that venture funding 
increases the rate of company’s innovative activities. (Kortum & Lerner, 2000) found that venture 
capital investments are more effective than external R&D investment in generating innovation. 
(Dessi & Yin, 2012) concluded that there is evidence of a substantial impact of venture capital on 
innovation, measured by patent counts, at the industry level but not on individual firm level. 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005) referred to firms that are funded by more experienced venture capitalists 
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are more likely to succeed. This could be because top tier venture capitalists are better able to 
identify high quality firms and entrepreneurs.  
           Argument raises sound in the literature, (Lee, 2004) investigated the innovation 
determinants in Malaysian manufacturing sector and resulted that the innovation propensity in large 
firms is greater than in small firms. additionally, private limited and public limited firms tend to 
innovate more than sole proprietorship firms. but, contrary to some previous studies we mentioned, 
the tendency to innovate is affected negatively by the size of exports. in addition, study analysis 
indicated that innovation is not affected by the foreign and local ownership composition of firms. 
Also, there are some evidences that the propensity of innovation is positively associated with 
market power and competition. (Choi, Lee, & Williams, 2011) analyzed data from 548 Chinese 
firms and found that the number of patents registered are strongly affected by foreign ownership in 
the firm by increasing the affiliation within the entire group. moreover, even though the innovation 
performance is correlated positively with state and institutional ownership in these Chinese firms, it 
seems to be lagged. by contrast, firms with only insider ownership tend to have lower innovation 
levels, hence it is expected that firms with concentrated ownership have no substantial impact. in 
term of innovation resources and their relation to firm characteristics, (Hitt , Hoskisson, Johnson,& 
Moesel, 1996) referred to that producing internal innovation is affected negatively by emphasizing 
financial controls and deemphasizing strategic controls because of acquisitions and liquidations. 
thus, gaining short-term rents in competitive advantage could be better strategy and that by seeking 
external innovation activities. 
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Chapter three 
3.  Research design and methodology 
3.1 Survey and sample  
           I used firm-level data from World Bank enterprise surveys (ES)2 to investigate the 
correlation between firm innovation and three drivers of investment climate, governance 
environment, firm characteristics, and finance choice. These surveys use standardized survey 
apparatuses to benchmark the investment environment of individual countries across the world 
and to examine firm behavior and performance. The surveys sample from the universe of 
registered businesses in each country and follow a stratiﬁed random sampling methodology. 
         One great advantage of the World Bank enterprise survey that providing unique database 
about firms’ behavior and performance during certain periods. In addition, it presents a broad 
coverage of innovation activities that firms undertake across developing countries3. Innovation 
has been defined in the survey as introducing new product and whether this product has new 
function and better quality, introducing new process and whether this process has new 
technology, obtaining patents, acquitting foreign tech- License, and improved automation. 
            Furthermore, the survey provides rich data about firm characteristics in term of firm 
size, firm age, ownership structure, industry, sales and production cost, employees skills, and 
                                            
2 ES gathers information about the experience of individual firms in country's business environment, it's main 
changes and challenges over time, and different constraints to private sector firm’s performance and growth. it is a 
set of firm-level comprehensive questionnaires of a representative sample of an economy's firms, it covers a broad 
range of business climate issues including innovation, access to finance, governance and corruption, business 
competition, infrastructure, security and crime, trade, and performance measures. 
3 Previously, rare consistent data on the nature of innovation outputs introduced by firms has been existed across 
countries. Moreover, these rare data typically involve patents and R&D expenditure only across developed 
countries   
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finance methods used by firms in purpose of maintaining performance growth. Additionally, 
suitable information regarding individual state-governance environment of these firms have 
been delivered, this includes data about illegal activities such as bribes or informal payments by 
firms to government officials that help us to understand to what extend these firms are 
victimized and information on the trust level of firms in court system that help us to understand 
to what extend the legal system is strong and influential in business environment.  
           The sample of this paper consists of 4,993 firms from seven East-Asian Pacific countries 
for the year 2015. These countries are Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippine, Vietnam, Timor Leste, 
Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea. Both manufacturing firm and service firms have been 
included in the sample as well as small, medium, and large firms have been considered to find 
size-differences effect on innovation within these firms. The sample includes firms with all 
kinds of legal structure, shareholding companies with shares trade represent (3.97%) from the 
panel firms, while shareholding company with non-traded shares are (24.91%), both two types 
are considered as corporations in the analysis, sole proprietorships denote (39.96%), Partnership 
(19.65%), Limited partnership (9.55%), and Other (1.68%). however, (0.28%) of the sample 
considered as unknown based on survey answers. Table (1) shows the distribution of panel 
firms across countries for the size and industry. 
Table 1: distribution of panel firms across countries 
Country / ratio-number Industry/ ratio-number Firm size/ ratio-number 
Country Freq/ratio Manufacturing Service Small Medium large 
Vietnam 20%~ 996 69%~ 685 31%~ 311 39%~ 389 35%~ 344 26%~ 263 
Indonesia 26%~ 1,320 81%~ 1069 19%~ 251 34%~ 457 35%~ 458 31%~ 405 
Philippine 27%~ 1,335 76%~ 1021 24%~ 314 35%~ 474 36%~ 475 29%~ 386 
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Papua New Guinea 1%~ 65 35%~ 23 65%~ 42 25%~ 16 54%~ 35 21%~ 14 
Timor Leste 3%~ 126 48%~ 60 52%~ 66 53%~ 67 42%~ 53 5%~ 6 
Malaysia 20%~ 1,000 59%~ 585 41%~ 415 38%~ 383 32%~ 322 30%~ 295 
Solomon Islands 3%~ 151 26%~ 40 74%~ 111 45%~ 68 40%~ 61 15%~ 22 
Sub total 4,993 70%~ 3483 30%~ 1510 37%~ 1854 35%~ 1748 28%~ 1391 
Total 4,993 4,993 4993 
 
3.2 Variables 
          By dividing firm innovation into three main parts, this paper examines innovation using 
eleven major indicators that represent innovation activities and dynamism in a broader aspect 
and they are the dependent variables of the study. Two main dummy variables have been 
constructed from the entire data base in term of measuring the section of innovation outputs, 
new product innovator and new process innovator. referring to the section of innovation 
activities followed by firms, five dummy variables have been developed, acquiring patents, 
investing in R&D, international quality certificate, foreign tech- license, and formal Training. In 
addition, four dummy variables have been presented for the third section which is effectiveness 
of innovation outputs, new function introduced by new product, better quality of new product, 
new technology from new process, and automation. furthermore, core innovation index, 
innovation activities index, and effectiveness innovation index are other three variables have 
been constructed to combine each section indicators.  
           The study uses sex dummy variables represent the measurements of governance 
environment, fair court, court obstacle, bribed firms, expected informal payments, foreign 
ownership, and state ownership. Furthermore, seven variables have been created for firm 
characteristics, firm’s age, firm size (small, medium, and large firm), exporter, R&D firm 
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investment, using foreign tech- license, formal training, manager experience, competition 
against informal, and international business. Finally, in purpose of measuring financing working 
capital within firms, the paper use four variables to determine the finance method firms follow 
to finance their working capital, internal finance (returned earnings), bank and financial 
institutions borrowing, on credit from suppliers, and informal finance from families or money 
lenders. These 16 independent variables are the main drivers of the correlation among 
innovation and the three factors. Country fixed effect and macroeconomic indicators have been 
employed as control variables for each section. Table (2) illustrates the study variables 
explanation and table (3) shows the summary statistics for all these variables: 
Table 2: variables explanation  
Dependent variables - innovation 
Variable Definition  
product Innovator A dummy variable equal to one if the firm introduced or developed any new or significantly 
improved product and 0 otherwise. 
process Innovator An aggregate dummy variable includes 5 dummies and equal to one if the firm introduced any new 
or significantly improved manufacturing method, logistics, management practices, marketing 
methods, supporting activities and 0 otherwise. 
Patents Dummy variable equal to one if the firm purchased or licensed any patented or non-patented 
inventions or other types of knowledge for innovation, and 0 otherwise. 
R&D investment Dummy variable equal to one if the firm spent on R&D activities, within the establishment or other 
companies contracted and 0 otherwise. 
Quality certification Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an internationally-recognized quality certification, and 
0 otherwise. 
Foreign Tech- 
License 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company 
and 0 otherwise. 
Formal Training Dummy variable equal to one if the firm runs formal training programs to any of its employees 
specifically for innovation, and 0 otherwise.  
New function Dummy variable equal to one if the new innovated product has completely new function compared 
with all other products in the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
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Better Quality Dummy variable equal to one if the new product has better quality compared with all other 
products in the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Automation  A dummy variable equal to one if the main new or significantly improved process automate manual 
processes, and 0 otherwise. 
New technology  A dummy variable equal to one if the main new or significantly improved process introduced new 
technology, and 0 otherwise. 
Core innovation 
index 
An aggregate dummy variable consists of two dummies and equal to one if the ﬁrm has introduced 
any core innovation output, new or developed product or process, and 0 if it has not introduced 
both. 
innovation activities 
index 
An aggregate dummy variable consists of five dummies and equal to one if the ﬁrm has undertaken 
any of the 5 different innovative activities described above, and 0 if it did not all. 
Innovation 
effectiveness index 
An aggregate dummy variable consists of four dummies and equal to one if the ﬁrm has achieved 
any of the 4 different innovative effectiveness indexes described above and 0 if it did not all. 
First independent variable set: Governance environment  
Fair court Dummy variable equal to one if the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted, and 0 
otherwise. 
Court obstacle Dummy variable equal to one if the firm consider the court system is either minor, moderate, 
major, or sever obstacle, and 0 if it is not obstacle. 
Expected informal An aggregate dummy variable consists of seven dummies and equal to one if the firm was asked to 
pay informal payments or gifts for obtaining electrical connection, water connection, construction 
permit, taxes reduction/exemption, import license, operating license, or cleaning customs, and 0 
otherwise. 
Bribed firm Dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid any amount or percentage of sales as informal 
payments or gifts, and 0 if it paid nothing. 
Foreign ownership Tow dummy variables equal to one if more than 10% and less than 50% of the firm is owned by 
private foreign individuals, companies or organizations and 0 if less than 10% and more than 50%. 
(additional one variable for 50% level of ownership). 
Government 
ownership 
Dummy variable equal to one if more than 10% of the firm is owned by the state, and 0 if less.  
Auditor Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s financial statements checked & certified by external 
auditor, and 0 otherwise 
Largest owner % Percentage of the largest Owner from whole ownership in the firm. 
Second independent/control variables set: Firm characteristics 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to one if the firm derives at least 10% of the sales from direct exports, and 0 
otherwise. 
Number of 
establishments 
Number of Establishments in The Firm. 
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Small firm Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has >=5 and <=19 employees, and 0 otherwise. 
Medium firm Dummy variable equal to one if the firm >=20 and <=99, and 0 otherwise. 
Large firm Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has >=100 employees, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm’s age Survey year minus the year in which the firm started operation. 
Corporation Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a shareholding with shares trade in the stock market or 
shareholding with non-traded shares or shares traded privately, and 0 otherwise. 
partnership Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a partnership or limited partnership, and 0 otherwise. 
sole proprietorship Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a sole proprietorship, and 0 otherwise. 
Capital city Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is located in the capital city, and 0 otherwise. 
Manager experience Years of experience of top manager working in the sector. 
Competitors Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has more than 10 competitors for the main product, and 0 
otherwise. 
Competition against 
informal 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm compete against informal or unregistered firms, and 0 
otherwise. 
International 
business 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s main product is sold mainly in international markets, 
and 0 otherwise. 
third independent variables set: External Finance of working capital 
External finance % of working capital financed from external sources rather than Internal finance (retained earnings) 
Access to bank loan 
or line of credit 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a line of credit or bank loan and 0 otherwise. 
banks Borrowing/ 
non-banks 
Borrowing  
Two contentious variables represent % of working capital ﬁnanced by the sum of ﬁnancing from 
banks and ﬁnancing from other financial institutions.  
On credit purchase 
 
Contentious variable represents % of working capital ﬁnanced by purchases on credit/advances 
from suppliers /customers 
Informal finance Contentious variable represents % of working capital financed by other (money lenders, friends, 
relatives, etc.) 
Firm performance dependent variables  
Productivity t Sales per worker for the last year 
Log Sales t  Log sales of last year 
Log operating 
income t 
Log sales – log production cost 
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Table (3) Summary Statistics 
 
Variable        Obs            Mean           Std. Dev.      Min      Max 
Innovator product 4,937 0.2402269 0.4272644 0 1 
Spending-R$D 4,923 0.1730652 0.3783421 0 1 
patents 4,897 0.1108842 0.3140208 0 1 
training 4,939 0.305325 0.4605916 0 1 
technology license 3,355 0.1997019 0.3998359 0 1 
quality certificate 4,767 0.2122928 0.4089739 0 1 
foreign ownership10% 4,993 0.1624274 0.3688794 0 1 
government_~ 4,993 0.0186261 0.1352139 0 1 
court fair 4,553 0.5996047 0.4900323 0 1 
exporter 4,993 0.204286 0.4032193 0 1 
exporter 4,993 0.204286 0.4032193 0 1 
manager experience 4,677 16.28694 10.1251 1 70 
Competition with informal 4,806 0.4500624 0.4975518 0 1 
new function 1,177 0.57774 0.4941295 0 1 
quality 1,163 0.9527085 0.212353 0 1 
International market 3,414 0.1511424 0.3582401 0 1 
automation 1,952 0.8002049 0.3999487 0 1 
process technology 1,942 0.6560247 0.4751553 0 1 
small firm 4,993 0.3686014 0.4824742 0 1 
large firm 4,993 0.2750907 0.446605 0 1 
medium firm 4,993 0.3563079 0.478956 0 1 
loan access 4,642 0.3804395 0.4855472 0 1 
borrowings 4,972 14.70294 23.61099 0 100 
Corporations 4,979 0.2896164 0.4536299 0 1 
partnerships 4,979 0.2928299 0.4551067 0 1 
sole proprietorship 4,979 0.4006829 0.4900861 0 1 
Other structure 4,979 0.0168709 0.1288005 0 1 
Innovator process 4,981 0.4408753 0.4965418 0 1 
informal expected 3,109 0.2245095 0.417326 0 1 
core innovation 4,960 0.4814516 0.4997062 0 1 
Innovation activities 3,986 0.6141495 0.4868566 0 1 
Innovation effectiveness 2,231 0.5347378 0.4989037 0 1 
foreign50% 4,993 0.0999399 0.2999499 0 1 
Government 50% 4,993 0.0070098 0.083439 0 1 
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bribed firm 2,967 0.3828783 0.4861709 0 1 
External finance 4,972 25.37751 30.58846 0 100 
 
 
3.3 Summary statistics  
   Table 3 summarizes the proportion of firms in each country conducted different types of 
innovations outputs and activities. Core innovation in the table refers to the main innovation 
outputs, introducing or developing new products or services and introducing or developing new 
processes. However, innovation activities index indicates the main efforts made by firms to 
generate innovative outputs. Also, some indicators have been selected to measure the innovation 
success represented in innovation effectiveness index.  
         Analysis across countries shows a degree of difference in term of three innovation indicator 
as well as the detailed measurements of innovation across the variety of categories for each 
country. Nevertheless, sample from Papua New Guinea ranks the highest rates in the context of 
innovation outputs and activities indicators while just under other countries in regard of 
effectiveness index. Even though the increasing economic growth, Indonesia and Malaysia 
records the lowest proportions in introducing new products and they are between the last ranks in 
introducing new processes as well as both countries, with Vietnam, state lower ranks of 
innovation generating efforts. Table (4) presents the percentages of firms in each country of the 
sample engaged in all innovation categories: 
 
 Table (4): the percentages of firms in each country undertaken innovation indicators  
               
 
 
29 
 
    co
u
n
try
 
p
ro
d
u
ct 
In
n
o
v
a
to
r
 
p
ro
ce
ss 
In
n
o
v
a
to
r
 
C
o
re
 
in
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 
in
d
ex
 
P
a
ten
ts 
R
&
D
 
in
v
estm
en
t 
Q
u
a
lity
 
ce
rtifica
te 
F
o
re
ig
n
 
T
ec
h
- L
ice
n
se
 
F
o
rm
a
l 
T
ra
in
in
g
 
in
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 
a
ctiv
ities 
in
d
ex
 
N
ew
 fu
n
ctio
n
 
Q
u
a
lity
 
A
u
to
m
a
tio
n
 
P
ro
ce
ss 
tec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
In
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 
effec
tiv
en
ess 
in
d
ex
 
Vietnam  0.31 0.52 0.83 0.04 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.26 0.82 0.46 0.98 0.87 0.57 2.88 
Indonesia  0.12 0.21 0.33 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.28 0.13 0.73 0.58 0.91 0.75 0.77 3.01 
Philippine 0.35 0.54 0.89 0.09 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.48 1.15 0.57 0.96 0.84 0.67 3.04 
Papua New Guinea 0.60 0.91 1.51 0.17 0.27 0.20 0.30 0.74 1.68 0.49 0.95 0.73 0.71 2.88 
Timor Leste 0.40 0.67 1.07 0.29 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.47 1.28 0.82 0.92 0.81 0.76 3.31 
Malaysia  0.10 0.54 0.64 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.29 1.2 0.78 0.91 0.72 0.63 3.04 
Solomon Islands 0.42 0.76 1.18 0.22 0.20 0.06 0.33 0.44 1.25 0.70 0.98 0.79 0.69 3.16 
 
 
      Table (5) shows the analysis across firms according firm size and legal status, large firms in 
the sample seem to be more innovative, see also (Ayyagari et al, 2010). The analysis reflects the 
acquisition of large firms on the greatest shares of three aggregate innovation indicators 
comparing with other two types.  although, the fractions are semi similar amongst the three firm 
sizes in the context of effectiveness index, large firms have 0.83 core innovation index, 1.61 
innovation activities index, and 3.02 Innovation effectiveness index. In addition, corporations 
and partnership firms are more innovative than sole proprietorship, the sample shows that 
corporations rank the highest aggregate innovation indexes with 0.92, 1.46, 3.03 respectively 
comparing with sole proprietorships which have 0.57, 0.57, 2.93 respectively.  
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Table (5): the percentages of firms undertaken innovation indicators according the size and legal 
status 
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Firm size 
Small firm 0.19 0.40 0.59 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.59 0.58 0.96 0.78 0.63 2.95 
Medium firm 0.26 0.46 0.72 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.30 0.92 0.58 0.95 0.81 0.65 2.99 
Large firm 0.28 0.55 0.83 0.18 0.24 0.43 0.32 0.44 1.61 0.57 0.95 0.81 0.69 3.02 
Legal status 
Corporation 0.33 0.59 0.92 0.16 0.28 0.34 0.20 0.48 1.46 0.58 0.96 0.85 0.64 3.03 
partnership 0.20 0.47 0.67 0.14 0.16 0.29 0.29 0.29 1.17 0.63 0.95 0.73 0.71 3.02 
sole proprietorship 0.21 0.36 0.57 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.57 0.54 0.95 0.82 0.62 2.93 
Other status 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.26 0.62 0.40 0.95 0.73 0.65 2.73 
 
Table (6) illustrates the correlation between all innovation variables, most innovation 
aspects are significantly correlated at 1% level. The coefficients of correlation matrix are ranged 
from 1% to 45%. The greatest coefficient of 45% refers to that firms that introduced or 
developed new processes are also highly likely to innovate or develop new products.  
    
Table (6): Correlation Matrix between the Firm Innovation Indicators 
indicator product 
innovator 
process  
innovator 
spending 
RD 
patents traini
ng 
Tech-
license 
quality 
cert 
new 
function 
quality automation Process 
tech 
product 1.00                     
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innovator 
process 
innovator 
0.45 1.00                   
Spending 
RD 
0.34 0.40 1.00                 
patents 0.20 0.31 0.32 1.00               
training 0.36 0.43 0.40 0.35 1.00             
technology 
license  
0.13 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.21 1.00           
quality cert 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 1.00         
new 
function 
. 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.06 1.00       
quality . 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 1.00     
automation 0.09 . 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 1.00   
Process tech 0.10 . 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.35 1.00 
 
         According the analysis of firm characteristics within the selected sample, small and 
medium firms are dominant – small firms represent 37% of the sample, medium firms make up 
35%, and large firms constitute 28% of the overall sample. Regarding the legal status, sole 
proprietorship ranks the highest in the sample with 40%, corporations and partnership firms 
equally denote 29% for each, and the other proportion 2% for other firm structures. The average 
age of the firms in the sample is 18.85 years. sample also illustrates that only 20.57% of the 
firms are direct exporters. The same statistics show that the average mean of managers 
experience is 16.29 years. 15.11% of the sample firms confirmed that international market is the 
main market for their products and sales in the last year while, the majority of firms operate in 
the local and national markets. In term of competition, the survey asked firms to state number of 
competitors in local market whether they are domestic, foreign, or state firms, the sample shows 
that around 2% of respondent firms have no competitors, 63% have more than 3,000 competitors 
and too many to count, 33% have competitors less than 100, and 2% of firms have competitors 
more than 100 and less than 3,000. In addition, 45% of firms compete against informal or 
unregistered firms in the local markets. 
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           Table (7) shows the correlation coefficients between firm characteristics and aggregate 
innovation indicators, most aggregate indicators and firm characteristics are significantly 
correlated at 1% level. The positive coefficients of correlation matrix are ranged from 1% to 
41%. The greatest coefficient of 41% refers to that firms that conduct innovation activities are 
also highly likely to innovate or develop core innovation outputs. Additionally, the results state 
the significant role of firm age and exporting in firm innovation. 
Table (7): Correlation Matrix between aggregate innovation indexes and firm characteristics  
indicator/firm 
characteristics 
core 
innovation 
index 
innovation 
activities 
index 
Innovation 
effectiveness 
index 
Firm size Age 
firm 
exporter Manager 
experience 
competition 
with 
informal 
international 
business 
core innovation 
index 
1.00         
innovation 
activities index 
0.41 1.00        
Innovation 
effectiveness 
index 
. 0.07 1.00       
Firm size 0.12 0.27 0.03 1.00      
Age firm 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.22 1.00     
exporter 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.25 0.06 1.00    
Manager 
experience 
0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 0.40 -0.04 1.00   
competition 
with informal 
0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 1.00  
international 
business 
0.10 0.16 0.04 0.23 -0.02 0.57 -0.01 -0.14 1.00 
 
The sample analysis institutes that around 60 % of firms believe that the court system is fair, 
impartial, and uncorrupted, the highest trust level in legal system has been shown in Timor Leste 
with 86.51% and the lowest level has been noticed in Solomon Islands with 33.33%. in term of 
informal payments, there were 38.29% bribed firms that made gifts or informal payments to 
public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services 
etc. the greatest proportion of bribed firms has been found in Papua New Guinea, it is 92.31% of 
whole respondent sample, also, firms in Timor leste, Vietnam, and Solomon Islands rank higher 
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level of bribery, 86.17%, 76.24%, 70.13%, respectively than Malaysia, 37.01% and Philippine, 
47.55%. Indonesian firms are more transparent with only 11.82%.  
An aggregate variable has been constructed to examine whether firm was asked to make 
gifts or informal payments, this includes a variety of survey questions in term of whether firm was 
asked to pay informal payments or make gifts to obtain electrical connection, water connection, 
construction-related permit, exemptions from inspections or meetings with tax officials, import 
license, operating license, or cleaning customs of exporting goods directly. According to sample 
analysis 22.45% of respondent firms were asked to make gifts or informal payments, this ratio 
appears to be higher in both Timor leste and Solomon Islands, while other countries states lower 
rates, for instance, Indonesia’s proportion is only 13.27%. Table (8) explains the percentages of 
firms in term of their responses about governance aspects. 
Table (8): the percentages of firms in term of their responses about governance aspects 
  Panel A      
Country Court fair Expected 
informal 
payments/gifts 
Bribed 
firms 
     Foreign ownership 
    10%               50% 
     State ownership 
   10%               50% 
Vietnam  67.43 24.11 76.24 8.23 6.53 3.51 1.51 
Indonesia  62.42 13.27 11.82 10.38 3.33 0.91 0.45 
Philippine 49.72 19.04 47.55 21.95 15.96 0.07 0 
Papua New Guinea 41.54 20.41 92.31 69.23 61.54 0 0 
Timor leste 86.51 53.91 86.17 2.38 0.79 2.38 0 
Malaysia  65.84 22.70 37.01 18.10 2.60 4.20 0.4 
Solomon Islands 33.33 45.65 70.13 46.36 39.07 0 0 
Average 59.96 22.45 38.29 16.24 8.97 1.86 0.5 
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The table also illustrates the firm governance and ownership structure of firms in the 
sample. The paper set two level of ownership in regard of foreign and state ownership of these 
firms, firms are 10% or more owned as an indicator of slight holding and firms more than 50% 
owned by these two owners.  It can be clearly seen that 16.24% of firms are owned by private 
foreigners at 10% level and 8.97% owned at 50% level, however, in term of government 
ownership, 1.86% of firms are owned by a state at 10% level and 0.5% of these firms are owned 
by a state at 50% level.  
Based on the ES questions, this study classifies firms into innovator and non-innovator 
and that is reflected in core innovation index variable. In addition, ES asked firms about their 
trust in court system and whether they paid or were asked to pay informal payments. Based on 
core innovation index that is constructed in this paper, I found that 49.68% of firms (2,476 out of 
4,984 firms) introduced new products or new processes. But, only 56.31% of innovative firms 
which responded to the court fairness question demonstrated their trust and 43.69% did not. 
However, 63.52% of non-innovative firms which answered the same question showed their trust 
and 36.48% did not. 
In regard of corruption, across the seven countries, firms were asked several questions in 
the context of making informal payments or gifts in many governmental deals, this paper found 
that 16.81% of firms were asked to make such action to obtain electrical connection, 21.46% for 
water connection, 23.64% for import license, 14.24% for operating license, 17.87% for cleaning 
exports customs, 13.24% for tax exemption, 22.04% for construction-related permit. 
Additionally, 29.09% of firms are innovators and they were asked to make informal payments or 
gifts for government officials and 70.91% innovators were not asked, however, only 12.29% of 
firms are non-innovator and they were asked, and 87.71% were not. Furthermore, only 2,964 
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firms – innovator and non-innovator – gave their feedback about making informal payments or 
gifts, 53.09% of those are innovators made such informal actions and 46.91% innovators did not, 
while 25.06% are non-innovators did the same behavior and 74.94% did not.  
Selecting finance channel is more crucial for firms and could affect their performance 
and innovation activities. In the study’s sample, determining the percentage of firms’ working 
capital financed from certain resources were requested to be identified. The survey recognizes 
financing working capital by two main categories, the internal funds / retained earnings, and the 
external finance such as borrowing from banks, borrowing from non-bank financial institutions, 
purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers, and funding by moneylenders, 
friends, relatives, etc. only for purpose of data summary, this paper divides finance level into 
three groups, small (from 1% to 20%), medium (from 21% to 50%) , and large (>50%) 
contribution. This study presents that only 2,549 firms employed external finance, 17.30 % of 
these have small external finance, 46.84% medium, and 35.86% large external finance4. Table 
(9) includes percentage of firms in each country employed three ways of finance and distribution 
of firm size across percentage of working capital finance. It is obviously shown that the majority 
of firms across countries and across size categories prefer to mix between external and internal 
finance. 
Table (9): % of firms in term of external finance levels across countries and firm size. 
  Panel A  
Country External finance (1%-20%) External finance (21%-50%) External finance (51% 100 %) 
Vietnam  21.09 38.42 40.49 
Indonesia  18.80 48.69 32.50 
                                            
4 In each level of firms’ finance, the complementary percentage is internal fund. 
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Philippine 16.67       42.67       40.67 
Papua New Guinea 13.04       21.74       65.22 
Timor leste 6.90       50.00       43.10 
Malaysia  11.53       53.46       35.01 
Solomon Islands 37.11       44.33       18.56 
Average 17.30       46.84       35.86 
Small firm 18.98       49.94       31.08 
Medium firm 18.31       45.08       36.61 
Large firm 14.15       45.22       40.63 
Average 17.30       46.84       35.86 
 
       A comparison between 2,307 innovative firms have access / have no access to loans, 
48.03% of those firms have access to bank finance or line of credit and 51.97% have no. 
moreover, the second external finance strategy (21%-50%) is the most favorable for innovative 
firms, hence 45.71% of innovators prefer this range, 37.14% prefer external finance more than 
50%, and 17.14% desire to be less than 20%.  
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Chapter four 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
All regressions are projected using ﬁrm-level data across 7 countries from East Asia and 
Pacific. This paper uses a logit probability model to estimate these regressions because the 11 
individual indicators of ﬁrm innovation are dummy variables with 0–1. However, Since the 
aggregate innovation indicators are cumulative and cross-country estimation with more than 100 
observations for almost countries, the study uses ordered logit model to estimate regression 
models for the three aggregate indicators.  
In the empirical results part, this paper goes to test a set of hypotheses were broadly 
discussed in the literature and linked to the study questions, these hypotheses are discussed in the 
following sections:  
4.1 Governance environment and firm innovation 
 In this section, this study examines the statistical association between governance 
environment in which firm operates and the extent to which firm innovates. I defined the 
governance environment as, first, the external environment which is related to trust in and 
strength of legal system as well as corruption and bribes. Second, the internal environment which 
includes ownership structure of firms, role of external audit, and the percentage of the largest 
owner has in the firm. Therefore, three main hypotheses are investigated in this section: 
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H1a: firms that pay bribes are more likely to engage in innovation than firms don’t pay. 
H1b: The difference between innovation for bribed firms in strong and weak court system is not 
different than the difference between non-bribed firms in strong and weak court system 
H1c: An increasing foreign ownership in local firms contributes significantly to their innovation 
activities. 
 In purpose of investigating this relationship, in the first step, I examine the impact of a 
variety of external governance variables on firm innovation and controlled them by firm size, 
firm age, legal statues, capital city, number of establishments in the firm, and country - industry 
fixed effect. The regression model for firm 𝑖 in country 𝑘 in industry 𝑗 is estimated in the 
following form:  
(1) 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 =
 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
𝛽3 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽6 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽7 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽8 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑗  + 𝐶𝑘 + 𝐼𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑗   
k = 1,...,7      j= 1,….41 
 Where Firm innovation𝑖,𝑘,𝑗  represents one of the three aggregate indicators (core 
Innovation Index, activities innovation index, or Innovation effectiveness index), or one of the 
eleven main indicators of innovation based on ﬁrms’ responses to survey questions. External 
governance𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 is trust in courts, court obstacle, bribed firms, expected informal payments or 
gifts. 𝐶𝑘 is vector of country ﬁxed effects, 𝐼𝑗   is vector of industry ﬁxed effects.  
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 In the second step, I examine the impact of ownership structure on firm innovation by 
employing related variables of foreign and state ownership at two levels of ownership (>10% and 
<=50%) and (>50%), the largest owner proportion of firm ownership, and whether financial 
statements of the firm are subjected to check by external auditor, and controlled them by firm 
size, firm age, legal statues, capital city, number of establishments in the firm, country-industry 
fixed effect. The following regression model I estimate is in the following form:  
(4)  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 =
 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
𝛽3 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽6 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽7 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽8 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
  𝐶𝑘 + 𝐼𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑘 
Internal governance𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 is foreign ownership dummy at >10% &<=50% level, >50% level, state 
ownership dummy at level >10%, external auditors dummy, and the proportion of the largest 
owner in the firm. 𝐶𝑘 is vector of country ﬁxed effects, 𝐼𝑗   is vector of industry ﬁxed effects.  
 
 Table (10) illustrates the coefficients of regression models in term of the correlation 
between governance environment and firm innovation. The firms’ managers were asked two 
questions regarding their trust in legal system, whether they believe that courts are fair and 
uncorrupted as well as the degree of the extent to which courts are obstacle to the current 
operations of firms. I found negative association among the strength of court system and firm 
innovation, firm that trusts courts system is less likely to engage in innovation activities and firm 
that consider courts are obstacle is more likely to innovate. That means firms can innovate even 
they face some obstacles in the legal system. The nature of legal system, whether it is flexible or 
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rigid, in the country plays a role in firm performance, (Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, & Riboni, 
2013) concluded that rigid legal regimes are favorable in terms of welfare and technological  
innovation outputs in the early stages of development. however, flexible systems are proper in 
development intermediate stages, but both systems are equivalent when technology is mature. 
So, the innovation outputs in the rigid system may be, in some cases, either low or high. 
  The main finding from Table (10) below is the positive correlation between paying 
informal payments and aggregate indexes of both core and activities of firm innovation, firms 
that pay bribes to public officials are more likely to innovate processes, but not products, than 
those don’t. additionally, they are more motivated to engage in almost innovation activities 
except foreign technology license, which indicates that innovative firms are public rent-seeking, 
hence they are somehow in need of government-provided services than non-innovative firms.     
  The same trend has been shown when I used the variable of whether firms were 
asked to make informal payments or gifts, it is clear from the coefficients in the table that all 
regression estimations between this variable and innovation outputs and activities are significant, 
which means that innovative firms are mostly targeted by corrupt public officials in purpose of 
avoiding bureaucratic regulations. But, there is no evidence that paying bribes leads to generate 
new functions and better quality of the new introduced or developed products as well as it 
doesn’t automate manual processes, partially or fully, and doesn’t introduce a new technology or 
method of the innovative processes. These results are robust in case of using other two 
contentious variables, percentage of total annual sales paid as informal payments and total annual 
informal payments, where both of them positively related to firm innovation. therefor, the results 
accept H1a that implies, firms that pay bribes are more likely to engage in innovation than firms 
don’t pay. 
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  While I couldn’t definitely rely on these results due to potential endogeneity concerns, I 
employed 2SLS-instrumental variable to find the causal relationship. A new variable has been 
generated for this purpose which is the percentage of total senior management's time was spent 
on dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations, but, I dropped the firms that 
were inspected or visited at least one time by tax officials. Therefore, the spent time is expected 
to be related to bribes or any other cases linked to legal system. This variable is uncorrelated to 
dependent variables (firm innovation) and correlated to explanatory variables, trust in court, 
paid bribes, and whether firms were asked to pay bribes.  
  The 2SLS results show no association at 5% level is reported between the extent to which 
firms trust court system with either the two core innovation variables nor the five innovation 
activities. However, similar results with logit regressions in term of the relation among paying 
bribes and innovation have been confirmed, where the significant correlation between firm 
innovation and firms pay bribes is hold when I instrumented the bribe variable with the 
instrumental variable of interaction time with government officials. thus, this study agrees with 
H1a that implies firms that pay bribes are more likely to engage in innovation than firms don’t 
pay.  It is noteworthy that the study of (Ayyagari et al., 2010) concluded that despite the 
negative correlation between firm performance and bribe payments, innovative firms having to 
make higher informal payments.  
      With respect of interaction between governance variables, I tested the interaction between 
bribed firm and fair court variables to discover the difference between innovation for bribed 
firms in strong and weak court system, whether it is different than the difference between non-
bribed firms in strong and weak court system by using this model: 
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𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑗
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗
+ 𝛽3 (𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗) +  𝐶𝑘 + 𝐼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘 
 The interaction regression coefficient is positive and significant in some of innovation 
aspects implying that there is different relationship between paying bribes and firm innovation 
for strong compared to weak court system. That difference is related to processes innovation 
rather than product innovation, and is existed in patents, quality certificate, and formal training 
and aggregate innovation activities indicators rather than others. So, H1b which says, “the 
difference between innovation for bribed firms in strong and weak court system is not different 
than the difference between non-bribed firms in strong and weak court system” is rejected in this 
test. 
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Table (10):  logit regression results between governance environment and innovation 
 
 
variables Product 
 
Innovator 
Process 
 
Innovator 
Core 
 
Innovatio
n 
 index 
Patents R&D 
 Spend 
Qualit
y 
 certif 
Foreign 
 Tech 
 License 
Formal  
Training 
Innov 
 Activiti 
 index 
New  
function 
Quality Automation Process  
tech 
Innovation 
 effectiv 
 index 
Fair court -0.3259 
(0.00) 
-0.1939 
(0.005) 
-0.2375 
(0.001) 
-0.1548 
(0.152) 
-0.2763 
(0.002) 
0.1904 
(0.833) 
-0.4213 
(0.00) 
-0.1045 
(0.174) 
-0.1536 
(0.029) 
-0.0858 
(0.538) 
0.3694 
(0.304) 
-0.0245 
(0.855) 
-0.0844 
(0.454) 
-0.3121 
(0.434) 
Court 
obstacle 
0.3700 
(0.00) 
0.4839 
(0.00) 
0.4753 
(0.00) 
0.4587 
(0.00) 
0.5222 
(0.00) 
0.2843 
(0.004) 
0.1676 
(0.116) 
0.4688 
(0.00) 
0.3599 
(0.00) 
-0.1092 
(0.477) 
-0.0580 
(0.870) 
0.2574 
(0.079) 
0.0426 
(0.730) 
-0.1301 
(0.778) 
Bribed firm 0.7466 
(0.508) 
 
0.6249 
(0.00) 
0.5839 
(0.00) 
0.7211 
(0.00) 
0.6656 
(0.00) 
0.4340 
(0.001) 
0.3385 
(0.019) 
0.4340 
(0.00) 
0.5563 
(0.00) 
0.6138 
(0.003) 
-0.4226 
(0.378) 
-0.0046 
(0.981) 
-0.3136 
(0.046) 
-1.0113 
(0.140) 
Expected 
informal 
0.5599 
(0.00) 
1.0044 
(0.00) 
1.0385 
(0.00) 
0.9359 
(0.00) 
0.8652 
(0.00) 
0.5803 
(0.00) 
0.5454 
(0.00) 
0.8666 
(0.00) 
1.0603 
(0.00) 
0.2433 
(0.186) 
-0.2920 
(0.488) 
0.1492 
(0.398) 
0.1103 
(0.435) 
0.0980 
(0.438) 
Fair court* 
Bribed firm 
-0.3128 
(0.059) 
0.3999 
(0.005) 
0.2799 
(0.050) 
0.5807 
(0.009) 
0.2685 
(0.142) 
0.4593 
(0.012) 
-0.1687 
(0.409) 
0.4369 
(0.006) 
0.4317 
(0.003) 
0.6921 
(0.022) 
0.7989 
(0.385) 
0.2711 
(0.318) 
-0.4319 
(0.065) 
1.1712 
(0.388) 
Foreign 
ownership> 
50% 
-0.1637 
(0.203) 
-0.1876 
(0.122) 
-0.1712 
(0.136) 
0.1548 
(0.383) 
0.2671 
(0.054) 
1.1461 
(0.00) 
0.6182 
(0.00) 
0.1776 
(0.149) 
0.4075 
(0.001) 
0.3334 
(0.155) 
0.2916 
(0.607) 
-0.3000 
(0.180) 
-0.1332 
(0.476) 
0.3257 
(0.639) 
Foreign 
ownership> 
10%&<=50% 
0.3179 
(0.031) 
0.3445 
(0.009) 
0.3469 
(0.009) 
0.8632 
(0.00) 
0.3250 
(0.026) 
1.0812 
(0.00) 
0.9956 
(0.00) 
0.4516 
(0.001) 
0.7972 
(0.00) 
0.2599 
(0.348) 
0.6931 
(0.295) 
0.0391 
(0.860) 
0.0397 
(0.839) 
1.2081 
(0.255) 
State 
ownership 
>10% 
0.5578 
(0.042) 
-0.2966 
(0.248) 
-0.3435 
(0.181) 
-0.5310 
(0.143) 
-0.1231 
 (0.667) 
0.6018 
(0.030) 
0.3032 
(0.334) 
0.1844 
(0.475) 
0.8497 
(0.009) 
0.6168 
(0.188) 
0.2734 
(0.810) 
0.2070 
(0.690) 
0.4252 
(0.304) 
-1.0639 
(0.337) 
External 
auditor 
0.4874 
(0.00) 
0.6422 
(0.00) 
0.6069 
(0.00) 
0.6968 
(0.00) 
0.6707 
(0.00) 
1.0444 
(0.00) 
1.0695 
(0.00) 
0.8119 
(0.00) 
0.9024 
(0.00) 
0.1481 
(0.368) 
0.1908 
(0.594) 
0.1230 
(0.376) 
0.4345 
(0.00) 
0.3129 
(0.456) 
Largest 
owner % 
0.0004 
(0.847) 
-0.0020 
(0.360) 
-0.0012 
(0.592) 
0.0079 
(0.013) 
-0.0005 
(0.814) 
0.0078 
(0.002) 
-0.0071 
(0.017) 
0.0029 
(0.205) 
0.0045 
(0.043) 
0.0013 
(0.734) 
-0.0003 
(0.971) 
0.0011 
(0.781) 
-0.0070 
(0.032) 
0.0038 
(0.747) 
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 In regard of internal governance, this paper compares between two levels of foreign 
ownership in local firms, foreign ownership >50% and foreign ownership between 10% and 
50%. I didn’t find evidence that firms with more than 50% foreign ownership innovate products 
or processes more than those foreign owned by less than 50%. But, there is evidence that these 
firms engage significantly in some innovation activities such as having international quality 
certificates, foreign technology licenses, and partially R&D investments. From the other side, 
firms with > 10% and <=50% are more likely to innovate products and processes more than 
those >50% foreign owned. I found also, even though the aggregate innovation activities index 
for >50% foreign owned firms is significant, the aggregate indicator of those with <50% has 
higher coefficient, they invest more in R&D, inventions, and foreign technology licenses. Thus, I 
suggest that innovation is correlated significantly with FDI at a certain level but not at level of 
control the local firms. therefore, I reject H1c because an increasing foreign ownership in local 
firms over 50% has a negative impact on their innovation activities. 
 This paper also examined the state ownership in local firms and whether there is any 
association with firm innovation. I concluded that there is a positive correlation between the 
increasing state ownership and product innovation and conducting international quality 
certificate only and not correlation with other innovation aspects. The results from the table also 
shows positive and considerable relations in the term of external audit and innovation linkage, 
regular check of firm’s financial statement by external auditor surge firm innovation activities as 
well as firms that subject to external audit are more likely to indulge in core innovation outputs. I 
also investigate whether the ownership percentage of firm the largest owner has is correlated 
with innovation, my results refer to substantial correlation between this ratio and some 
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innovation activities such as patents, international quality certificate, and foreign technology 
license. But it doesn’t make sense in core innovation.  
4.2 Firm characteristics and firm innovation 
     By using logit regression and ordered logit model, I investigated the association between 
firm innovation and firm characteristics and estimated the regression models into tow equations: 
the first one uses firm age, size, number of establishments, and legal status as predictors for firm 
innovation. Then the first equation is considered as a baseline equation and build on it to 
examine the second equation to estimate the relation between firm innovation and its trade and 
market characteristics and that by fixing firm size, age, legal status and number of establishments 
in the firm as control variables alongside country and industry fixed effect. For this purpose, a set 
of hypotheses have been constructed and tested based on literature findings: 
H2a: younger firms are more likely to innovate than older ones. 
H2b: larger firms are more innovative than medium-sized and small businesses. 
H2c: Corporations are more likely to engage in innovation activities than partnerships, 
proprietorships, and other legal status of firms. 
H2d: Number of establishments positively correlated to firm’s probability to innovate. 
H2e: Exporter firms are more innovative than un-exporter ones. 
H2f: highly experienced top managers in the firms hamper firm innovation. 
H2g: Number of competitors affects negatively on firm innovation. 
H2h: Competition against informal firms increases the probability of firm innovation. 
H2i: Firms compete in international markets are more likely to innovate than those compete in 
demotic and national markets. 
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The estimation of the first model is as follows: 
(1) 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽3 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽5 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝐶𝑘 + 𝐼𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑗   
k = 1,...,7; j = 1,...,41, 
where 𝐶𝑘 is vector of country ﬁxed effects, 𝐼𝑗   is vector of industry ﬁxed effects, and Firm 
innovation𝑖,𝑘,𝑗  represents 1 of the three aggregate indicators (core Innovation Index, activities 
innovation index, or Innovation effectiveness index), or 1 of the 11 main indicators of innovation 
based on ﬁrms’ responses to survey questions.  
The estimation of the second model is as follows: 
(2)𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽3 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽5 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽6 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +   𝐶𝑘 +  𝐼𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 
k = 1,...,7; j = 1,...,41, 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 is a vector of variables describing different aspects of the ﬁrm’s trade and market 
characteristics, competition against informal sector, number of competitors for the main product, 
exporter firm, manager’s years of experience working in the sector, and whether the main market 
in which firm sell its main product is an international market. 
          Table (11) explains the estimated coefficients of both baseline and second regression 
models. The table demonstrates that most of individual firm characteristics are significantly 
associated with firm innovation outputs and activities but not with the quality of innovation, that 
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can be clearly seen from the estimated results in the table where most of the significance levels 
are less than 0.05.  
Firm age is closely correlated with core innovation outputs either in aggregate indicator 
or in individual indicators such as introducing or developing new products and processes. Also, it 
is linked with firm innovation activities such as purchasing/licensing patented or non-patented 
inventions, spending on R&D, acquiring international quality certificate, using foreign 
technology license, and proving formal training to employees in purpose of developing or/and 
introducing new products or/and processes
5
. So, there is no evidence that younger firms in East 
Asia and Pacific countries are more likely to innovate than older ones. Thus, H2a is rejected. 
Regarding firm size, the paper found that large firms and medium-sized firms are more 
likely to introduce or develop new products and processes than small ones. In addition, they are 
more likely to undertake innovation activities than small firms
6
. However, the estimated 
coefficients in the regression models imply that probability to innovate in larger firms exceeds 
that in medium-sized ones either in the context of core innovation outputs or in undertaking 
innovation activities. This is clear in the table, compared to medium-sized firms, large firms are 
more likely to innovate new products and processes, spend on R&D, undertake patents activities, 
obtain international quality certificate, use technology licensed from foreign-owned companies, 
and runs formal training programs. Thus, this paper supports the H2b hypothesis of that larger 
firms in East Asia and Pacific countries are more innovative than medium-sized and small 
businesses. 
                                            
5 Ayyagari et al, 2011 found that younger firms are more innovative. But, their innovation measurements are 
different from this paper. 
6  In unreported statistics, a negative correlation between small firms and most of innovation activities and core 
innovation outputs has been states. 
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        Legal status of firms has no substantial impact on firm innovation compared to firm size, 
this study’s statistics show different result to (Ayyagari et al, 2011) where they found that 
corporations are more innovative than partnerships and sole proprietorships. However, my 
reported estimations found similar results, corporations are more likely to innovate than 
partnerships and sole-proprietorships, but this is in case of non-controlling by firm size, while this 
correlation is not persisted in case of controlling by firm size. Regarding innovation activities 
engagement, corporations are more likely to undertake innovation activities like patents, R&D 
investments and others than other legal statuses even in case of size control. So, H2c is not 
accepted here in the context of core innovation only. 
This paper rejects H2d. Controlling for size, age, and legal status, there is no evidence 
that the number of establishments in the firm rises the probability that a ﬁrm will introduce or 
develop new process or/and new product. While, it is positively correlated to firm’s efforts to 
obtain foreign technology license. Firms located in official capital city are more innovative than 
those outside the capital. 
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Table (11):  logit regression between Firm characteristics and innovation 
 
variables Product 
 
Innovator 
Process 
 
Innovator 
Core 
 
Innovation 
 index 
Patents R&D 
 spend 
Qualit
y 
 certif 
Foreign 
 Tech 
 License 
Formal  
Training 
Innov 
 Activiti 
 index 
New  
function 
Quality Auto- 
mation 
Process  
tech 
Innov 
 effectiv 
 index 
Age firm 0.0119 
(0.00) 
0.0062 
(0.024) 
0.0075 
(0.008) 
0.0145 
(0.00) 
0.0118 
(0.00) 
0.0159 
(0.00) 
0.0108 
(0.002) 
0.0081 
(0.005) 
0.0099 
(0.001) 
0.0016 
(0.728) 
-0.0006 
(0.961) 
-0.0015 
(0.762) 
0.0042 
(0.315) 
-0.0064 
(0.626) 
Large 
firm  
0.6919 
(0.00) 
0.7599 
(0.00) 
0.7681 
(0.00) 
1.0863 
(0.00) 
0.7685 
(0.00) 
1.9627 
(0.00) 
1.2417 
(0.00) 
1.2802 
(0.00) 
1.6194 
(0.00) 
-0.1051 
(0.543) 
-0.1357 
(0.732) 
0.1607 
(0.327) 
0.3101 
(0.024) 
-0.4162 
(0.389) 
Medium 
firm  
0.4100 
(0.00) 
0.2793 
(0.044) 
0.3386 
(0.00) 
0.2236 
(0.09) 
0.4515 
(0.00) 
0.7974 
(0.00) 
0.4453 
(0.001) 
0.5098 
(0.00) 
0.5961 
(0.00) 
-0.0725 
(0.649) 
-0.0372 
(0.920) 
0.1031 
(0.487) 
0.1381 
(0.264) 
-0.4488 
(0.311) 
Corporations  
 
0.0606             
(0.515) 
0.2451 
(0.091) 
0.1344 
(0.112) 
0.4939 
(0.00) 
0.5262 
(0.00) 
0.8687 
(0.00) 
0.1798 
(0.187) 
0.2017 
(0.02) 
0.3431 
(0.00) 
0.2053 
(0.174) 
-0.1500 
(0.675) 
0.3906 
(0.009) 
-0.1583 
(0.187) 
0.6248 
(0.144) 
Capital city 
 
0.5481 
 (0.00) 
0.7508 
(0.00) 
0.7613 
(0.00) 
0.4042 
(0.007) 
0.5070 
(0.00) 
0.2255 
(0.060) 
0.7588 
(0.00) 
0.4105 
(0.00) 
0.6589 
(0.00) 
-0.2321 
(0.154) 
-1.0920 
(0.002) 
0.3109 
(0.077) 
0.3650 
(0.01) 
-0.4923 
(0.250) 
Number of 
establishments 
0.0005 
 (0.539) 
0.0015 
(0.330) 
0.0021 
(0.229) 
0.0016 
(0.229) 
0.0004 
(0.632) 
0.0009 
(0.414) 
0.0219 
(0.002) 
0.0009 
(0.382) 
0.0087 
(0.006) 
-0.0040 
(0.202) 
0.0345 
(0.276) 
0.0020 
(0.581) 
-0.0012 
(0.241) 
0.1181 
(0.487) 
exporter 0.5527 
(0.00) 
0.4834 
(0.00) 
0.5452 
(0.00) 
0.8998 
(0.00) 
0.6755 
(0.000) 
1.2089 
(0.000) 
0.7706 
(0.000) 
0.5204 
(0.000) 
0.9630 
(0.000) 
0.3488 
(0.034) 
-0.1865 
(0.819) 
0.1474 
(0.368) 
0.0935 
(0.498) 
0.1186 
(0.335) 
competitors -0.4927 
(0.00) 
-0.4800 
(0.00) 
-0.5095 
(0.00) 
0.0432 
(0.811) 
-0.1501 
(0.254) 
-0.0781 
(0.541) 
-0.0579 
(0.646) 
-0.3957 
(0.000) 
0.0622 
(0.535) 
-0.0445 
(0.671) 
-0.5089 
(0.087) 
0.0256 
(0.812) 
-0.1598 
(0.068) 
-0.0846 
(0.269) 
Competition 
informal 
0.6362 
(0.00) 
0.7624 
(0.00) 
0.7476 
(0.00) 
0.4235 
(0.00) 
0.5934 
(0.00) 
-0.0259 
(0.776) 
0.4411 
(0.000) 
0.4462 
(0.000) 
0.4504 
(0.000) 
-0.1572 
(0.306) 
-0.1018 
(0.774) 
0.1079 
(0.447) 
0.0890 
(0.456) 
-0.0775 
(0.475) 
Manager 
experience 
0.0084 
(0.033) 
 0.0025 
(0.505) 
0.0044 
(0.239) 
-0.0218 
(0.00) 
-0.0068 
(0.128) 
-0.0165 
(0.001) 
-0.0124 
(0.019) 
-0.0093 
(0.019) 
-0.0168 
(0.00) 
-0.0077 
(0.289) 
0.0100 
(0.564) 
0.0028 
(0.709) 
0.0019 
(0.770) 
-0.0013 
(0.808) 
International 
business 
0.2944 
(0.015) 
0.2704 
(0.017) 
0.3474 
(0.002) 
0.7469 
(0.00) 
0.2431 
(0.069) 
1.2590 
(0.000) 
0.7483 
(0.000) 
0.6002 
(0.000) 
0.6324 
(0.000) 
0.2096 
(0.381) 
0.1552 
(0.771) 
0.0291 
(0.901) 
0.2630 
(0.169) 
0.2661 
(0.118) 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
            This study also examined the impact of trade orientation on firm innovation. The 
estimations regarding the linkage among being exporter or un-exporter firm and its innovation 
progresses are constant with findings in the literatures, see (Richardson & Rindal,1995; Ayyagari 
et al, 2011), hence the statistics provide evidence that exporter firms are more likely to innovate 
new products and processes than un-exporter firms. In addition, the probability of exporters to 
invest in innovation activities such as inventions, R&D, quality certificates, training, and foreign 
technology licenses outweigh the probability of un-exporters. Due to previous analysis, H2e is 
accepted, exporter firms are more innovative than un-exporter ones. 
Furthermore, even though, there is a significant positive association between the year of 
top manager experience and innovating a new product, there is no evidence that firms with more 
experienced top managers in the sector tend to innovate new processes more than those with less 
experienced top managers. However, I found a negative correlation between manager experience 
years and aggregate innovation activities index. thus, the persistence of such kind of managers 
diminishes the probability of firms to undertake innovation activities such as purchasing patented 
or non-patented inventions, obtaining international quality certificate, and arranging formal 
training for innovation. See also (Daellenbach et al, 1999)
7
. therefore, I prop H2f, highly 
experienced top managers in the firms hamper firm innovation. 
The influence of marketing and competition standings on innovation have been tested as 
well. In the context of competition, this paper investigated whether firm innovation correlated to 
the number of competitors and competition against informal sector or not. Results suggest that 
greater number of competitors, the lower probability that the firm will innovate new products 
and processes. Additionally, the ability of firms that compete more than 10 competitors are not 
                                            
7 They found no evidence that average experience years of top management team within the company's industry are 
positively linked with the firm's adherence to innovation.  
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linked to their engagement in innovation activities except formal training which is negatively 
linked with number of competitors. So, H2g, Number of competitors affects negatively on firm 
innovation, is confirmed. 
From the other side, the managers in the survey were asked whether their firm compete 
against unregistered or informal firms, the study’s estimations imply that competition against 
informal sector increases the probability of firms to undertake core innovation outputs like new 
products and processes as well as innovation activities, particularly investing in R&D. therefore, 
these results support H2h that suggests competition against informal firms increases the 
probability of firm innovation. 
 With respect of firm’s marketing strategy of its main product, the coefficients in the table 
show that the higher opportunity of selling the firm’s main product in international markets, the 
more likely that the ﬁrm will engage in aggregate core innovation as well as conduct in 
international quality certificate and other innovation activities. Consequently, H2i is not rejected, 
firms compete in international markets are more likely to innovate than those compete in demotic 
and national markets. 
4.3 Finance and firm innovation 
In this section, this study investigates the association among finance channels of which 
firms in East Asia and Pacific countries employ to finance their working capital. In the survey, 
firms’ managers were asked to determine the proportion of working capital financed and fixed 
assets by a variety of channels as well as firms were asked whether they have access to banks 
loan or not. This paper defines the external finance to be the percentage of working capital that 
are financed by external resources such as borrowing from bank or non-bank institutions and 
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informal channels like families and friends, however, retained earnings is considered to be the 
internal resource
8
. The solo hypothesis in this section is: 
  
H3: firms access to external finance are more likely to innovate than those dependent mostly on 
internal finance. In addition, the nature of channels by which external finance plays a significant 
role in shaping the level of firm innovation.  
By controlling for firm characteristics and country-industry fixed effect, the following model is 
estimated: 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 =
 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽3 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
 𝛽4 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
𝛽7 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +   𝐶𝑘 +  𝐼𝑗+𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑗    
k = 1,...,7; j = 1,...,41, 
where external finance represents the proportion of working capital that are 
financed by the four finance channels, bank borrowing, non-bank borrowing, purchase on credit 
or in advance from customers, and informal finance such as friends and relatives, or bank loan 
dummy, whether the firm has a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution. 
             Table (12) shows that in general, access to external finance boosts the probability to 
extend innovation outputs and activities more than internal finance. As it is explained in the 
estimated coefficients, firms with easy access to external finance are more likely to introduce 
new products and processes as well as engage in R&D, patents, and other activities. These 
findings are constant with testing the correlation but using the dummy variable of access to 
                                            
8 In the survey, the sum of all mentioned external finance channels represents the complementary ratio (100%) of 
internal finance variable.  
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bank loans where the coefficient of this dummy is positively associated with most of individual 
and aggregate indexes of innovation outputs and activities. however, access to loans doesn’t 
guarantee firms accessibility to international quality certificates. Moreover, from the 
coefficients of external finance and loan access in term of individual and aggregate innovation 
effectiveness, there is no evidence that access to external finance ensure the effectiveness of 
innovation. 
In comparison between bank borrowing and non-bank borrowing, I found that 
access to finance from non-bank financial institutions such as microfinance institutions, credit 
cooperatives, credit unions, or finance companies contributes more than bank finance in 
extending products/process innovation and R&D investment. While, the opposite is true 
regarding foreign technology license and formal training. 
Further finance channels have been presented in this analysis, firms that don’t have 
access to loans from financial institutions use another finance methods such as purchasing on 
credit or borrow from relatives or friends. In this table, we can see that using on credit 
purchases or in advances from costumers significantly associated with the probability of firms 
to innovate core outputs and conduct innovation activities. by contrast, even though, the 
coefficient of informal finance variable is positive and considerably correlated to both 
introducing new product, new processes, and R&D investing, the aggregate indexes of 
innovation activities are not significant.  
Therefore, we can support the third hypothesis which suggests that external finance is 
more influential than internal resources like retained earnings in fostering firm innovation. Also, 
the study confirms that the nature of channels by which external finance play a significant role in 
shaping the level of firm innovation. 
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The previous results in the second section, small firms are negatively correlated with 
innovation aspects compared to large and medium firms. additionally, the results in this section 
showed that access to loans is positively associated with firm innovation. but, in case of 
interaction between both variables the results constitute non-correlation on innovation aspects 
except the positive relationship with patents. Furthermore, I did interaction model in term of 
firms that have access to loans and pay bribes, I found no difference for the previous results for 
each except in some innovation activities.   
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Table (12): Regression between external finance and innovation 
 
 
 
variables Product 
 
Innovator 
Process 
 
Innovator 
Core 
 
Innovation 
 index 
Patents R&D 
 spend 
Quality 
 certif 
Foreign 
 Tech 
 License 
Formal  
Training 
Innov 
 Activiti 
 index 
New  
function 
Quality Autom- 
ation 
Process  
tech 
Innovation 
 effectiv 
 index 
External 
finance 
0.0082 
(0.00) 
0.0128 
(0.00) 
0.0134 
(0.00) 
0.0057 
(0.001) 
0.0072 
(0.00) 
0.0061 
(0.00) 
0.0079 
(0.00) 
0.0069 
(0.00) 
0.0099 
(0.00) 
-0.0036 
(0.151) 
-0.0153 
(0.007) 
-0.0020 
(0.411) 
-0.0001 
(0.994) 
-0.0012 
(0.497) 
Loan Access 0.4724 
(0.00) 
0.8833 
(0.00) 
0.8228 
(0.00) 
0.3806 
(0.00) 
0.6447 
(0.00) 
0.1587 
(0.071) 
0.5157 
(0.00) 
0.6655 
(0.00) 
0.7730 
(0.00) 
0.2231 
(0.163) 
0.4879 
(0.213) 
0.2027 
(0.170) 
-0.0313 
(0.802) 
-0.0320 
(0.774) 
banks 
Borrowing  
0.0029 
(0.077) 
0.0080 
(0.00) 
0.0073 
(0.00) 
0.0028 
(0.215) 
0.0022 
(0.220) 
0.0035 
(0.061) 
0.0059 
(0.007) 
0.0058 
(0.00) 
0.0072 
(0.00) 
0.0037 
(0.255) 
-0.0065 
(0.335) 
-0.0014 
(0.661) 
0.0062 
(0.023) 
0.0055 
(0.02) 
Non-bank 
Borrowing 
0.0131 
(0.005) 
0.0126 
(0.002) 
0.0153 
(0.001) 
0.0076 
(0.151) 
0.0169 
(0.00) 
0.0170 
(0.00) 
0.0044 
(0.465) 
0.0074 
(0.083) 
0.0137 
(0.001) 
0.0045 
(0.660) 
-0.0375 
(0.010) 
0.0079 
(0.370) 
-0.0095 
(0.162) 
-0.0048 
(0.433) 
Credit 
/advance 
0.0139 
(0.00) 
0.0233 
(0.00) 
0.0256 
(0.00) 
0.0106 
(0.00) 
0.0105 
(0.00) 
0.0083 
(0.00) 
0.0109 
(0.00) 
0.0098 
(0.00) 
0.0155 
(0.00) 
-0.0079 
(0.037) 
-0.0131 
(0.073) 
-0.0005 
(0.884) 
-0.0031 
(0.320) 
0.0055 
(0.046) 
Informal 
finance 
0.0093 
(0.006) 
0.0070 
(0.036) 
0.0066 
(0.007) 
-0.0017 
(0.730) 
0.0106 
(0.003) 
0.0020 
(0.636) 
0.0052 
(0.276) 
0.0020 
(0.559) 
0.0026 
(0.427) 
-0.0115 
(0.091) 
-0.0091 
(0.536) 
-0.0029 
(0.669) 
-0.0110 
(0.047) 
-0.0153 
(0.006) 
Loan 
access*small 
firms 
0.1239 
(0.453) 
0.0521 
(0.718) 
0.0531 
(0.713) 
0.7822 
(0.001) 
-0.1239 
(0.511) 
0.3288 
(0.133) 
0.1347 
(0.567) 
0.0093 
(0.990) 
-0.0626 
(0.664) 
-0.1087 
(0.711) 
0.3288 
(0.133) 
0.1003 
(0.702) 
0.2359 
(0.282) 
0.3861 
(0.637) 
Loan Access* 
bribed firms 
0.6116 
(0.004) 
0.4384 
(0.027) 
0.4520 
(0.023) 
0.2154 
(0.434) 
0.1995 
(0.397) 
0.8435 
(0.00) 
-0.6687 
(0.009) 
0.1626 
(0.429) 
-0.1007 
(0.596) 
0.9361 
(0.013) 
0.0404 
(0.961) 
-0.0078 
(0.982) 
-0.2162 
(0.447) 
0.7561 
(0.563) 
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4.4 How much innovation activities engaged by innovative firms can progress innovation 
effectiveness? 
Although, in table (13) this study explains the correlation, at 10% significance level, 
among innovation activities undertaken by firms and whether the new innovations from products 
and processes could progress their targets, I couldn’t find a significant association between 
governance, firm characteristics, and external finance with innovation effectiveness despite of 
employing a variety of instrumental variables like top management interaction time with public 
officials, average numbers of year of employees education, and the average numbers of 
employees who completed secondary school. Thus, this paper is incapable to address 
endogeneity worries and hence leave the identiﬁcation issues in this area for future work. 
Table (13): regression between innovation activities and innovation effectiveness 
 
        The table shows that firm engagement in purchasing or licensing patented or unpatented 
inventions increase the probability of only generate new technology or method from its new 
introduced or developed process. While this invention has no any relationship with other 
Logit reg New  
function 
Quality Automation Process  
technology 
Innovation 
 effectiveness 
 index 
Patents 0.1892 
(0.251) 
0.1353 
(0.713) 
0.1984 
(0.182) 
0.5311 
(0.00) 
0.0910 
(0.834) 
R&D spending 0.0577 
(0.057) 
0.4707 
(0.159) 
0.2999 
(0.021) 
0.3733 
(0.00) 
1.6922 
(0.006) 
International Quality 
certificate 
0.2968 
(0.051) 
0.0988 
(0.782) 
0.1904 
(0.191) 
0.2486 
(0.041) 
-0.5097 
(0.223) 
Foreign Technology 
License 
-0.0058 
(0.882) 
0.5605 
(0.178) 
0.2096 
(0.241) 
0.8256 
(0.00) 
1.2013  
(0.081) 
Formal Training 0.3814 
(0.004) 
0.8046 
(0.011) 
0.2862 
(0.019) 
0.5132 
(0.00) 
0.8041 
(0.031) 
Innov Activity 
index 
0.3043 
(0.039) 
0.9073 
(0.005) 
0.2337 
(0.075) 
0.5281 
(0.00) 
0.6487 
(0.070) 
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innovation effectiveness indicators and the aggregate index. Spending on R&D has more impact 
than patents in term of new developed product’s having completely a new function comparing to 
other products as well as automation of manual processes and introducing a new technology or 
method from new developed process. 
                Firm’s possession of internationally-recognized quality certification increases the 
probability to obtain a new product with new function and new technology from new developed 
process. However, using technology licensed from foreign-owned firms is correlated positively 
with only introducing a new technology or method from new developed process. While, the role 
of formal training appears to be the most influential activity where firms who provide formal 
training to any of their employees specifically for the development and/or introduction of new or 
significantly improved products or services and processes are more likely to progress all the 
required effectiveness indicators of new products or processes.   
4.5 How the performance of innovative firms is affected by governance environment and 
external finance? 
In this section, this paper examines how innovation performance is affected by the 
interaction between business environment. I generated financial indicators for innovative firms 
from the survey dataset as well as the previous effectiveness measurements. In the survey firms 
were asked to determine their total sales for two periods, for the last year and for three years ago. 
Thus, the first measurement is the log productivity for the last year which is equal to sales per 
worker as the following formulas: 
log (productivity 𝑡= Total Sales 𝑡 / full time employees number𝑡)   
          The second measurement is log total sales for the last year and the third one is operating 
income of innovators, it is the difference between log total sales and log cost of production for 
 
 
59 
 
last year. Even though firms were asked to state a variety of operating costs, it is not possible to 
determine the accurate net income for all firms in the sample hence the firms were not asked for 
all financial statements information. 
 log operating income 𝑡= log total Sales 𝑡  -  log 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  
  By using two-sample t-test to compare the means of productivity change between 
innovative firms and non-innovative firms, the results indicated that there is a statistically 
significant difference among means ratios (p=0.0047). hence, non-innovative firms have 
statistically significantly higher mean ratios on productivity (0.017) than innovative ones 
(0.0095) in introducing new process while, there is no a statistically significant difference among 
means ratios (p=0.6787) in term of products innovation hence, both non-innovators and 
innovators have semi-equal means (0.14, 0.13) respectively. T-test for log operating income 
showed that innovators have statistically significantly higher mean values of operating income 
than non-innovators (0.053, 0.46) respectively. While, the opposite is correct in term of change 
in total sales between the two periods, non- innovators reported greater means percentages than 
innovators (0.15, 0.11).  
     Table (14) illustrates OLS results regarding the impact of governance, firm characteristics, 
and finance on innovative firms’ performance. I used a set of independent variables of 
governance and finance to regress on three dependent variables of innovation performance. 
Furthermore, the aggregate variables of core innovation and innovation activities are used as 
explanatories while, all models have been controlled by firm characteristics and external finance 
in addition to country-industry fixed effect.   
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 =
 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝑍𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽3 𝑋𝑍𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
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 𝛽5 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
𝛽7 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 +
  𝐶𝑘 +  𝐼𝑗+𝜀𝑖,𝑘,𝑗    
   
    Where 𝑋𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 are vectors of variables describing different aspects of governance, 
finance, and innovation (new product or process, activities, are used as independent variables). 
Innovation performance is productivity, sales, and operating income for the last year. 
    Table (14) shows the extent to which the performance of innovative firms is affected by 
their efforts to undertake innovation outputs and activities as well as the association among 
performance indicators and governance-innovation interaction.  The results refer to a significant 
positive correlation between innovation and firm performance, innovative firms, either produced 
outputs or engaged in innovation activities, are more likely to get better high productivity, sales 
growth, and operating income than non-innovators. Moreover, as much as firms undertake 
innovation activities such as patents and R&D spending, they could introduce or develop new 
products and processes rather than those do not undertake. 
Even though, in previous results, there was no correlation between stronger court system 
and innovation capability of the firms, trust in court system fosters the productivity and sales of 
innovative firms, that can bee seen in case of interaction between innovation and court system 
trust hence, innovative firms’ trust in legal system increases their abilities to innovate. However, 
the interaction between innovation and corruption variables constitutes a negative impact on 
performance, innovative firms who pay bribes are less likely to achieve higher levels of 
productivity, sales growth, and operating income than those do not make informal payments in 
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spite of that previously concluded in this paper that innovative firms tend to pay informal 
payments to avoid bureaucracy. 
 
 
Table (14): Regression of performance indicators and governance-innovation interaction. 
 
    The table also presents that tax administration problems in the governance system has no 
substantial influence on firm innovation and performance except it’s negative impact on sales of 
all firms regardless of their innovation progress. Although, the interaction of firm’s managers 
variables Productivity t Log Total sales t Log Operating profit t 
 All 
sample 
Innovators All sample Innovators All 
sample 
Innovators 
innovator 0.2800 
(0.00) 
X 0.6781 
(0.00) 
X 0.1726 
(0.00) 
X 
Activity innovator 0.5093 
(0.00) 
0.4882 
(0.00) 
1.0991 
(0.00) 
0.9515 
(0.00) 
0.2640 
(0.00) 
0.2432 
(0.001) 
Fair court -0.0082 
(0.881) 
0.2191 
(0.005) 
-0.0139 
(0.822) 
0.1792 
(0.04) 
-0.0155 
(0.722) 
0.0758 
(0.261) 
Innovator*fair court 0.3407 
(0.002) 
X 0.5219 
(0.00) 
X 0.1548 
(0.071) 
X 
Bribed firms -0.3073 
(0.00) 
-0.5175 
(0.00) 
-0.0235 
(0.790) 
-0.1495 
(0.230) 
0.2346 
(0.00) 
0.1393 
(0.150) 
Innovator*bribed 
firm 
-0.7628 
(0.00) 
X -0.6605 
(0.00) 
X -0.3240 
(0.004) 
 
X 
Tax administration 
obstacle 
0.0372 
(0.496) 
-0.0502 
(0.537) 
0.2012 
(0.001) 
0.0541 
(0.552) 
0.0623 
(0.150) 
0.0639 
(0.352) 
Interaction time 
public official 
-0.0130 
(0.00) 
-0.0076 
(0.067) 
-0.0165 
(0.00) 
-0.0044 
(0.349) 
-0.0030 
(0.202) 
0.0011 
(0.754) 
Foreign 
ownership>10 <=50 
0.4707 
(0.00) 
0.3031 
(0.020) 
1.0350 
(0.020) 
0.8898 
(0.020) 
0.2376 
(0.002) 
0.1520 
(0.141) 
Informal finance -0.0163 
(0.00) 
-0.0185 
(0.00) 
-0.0199 
(0.00) 
-0.0226 
(0.00) 
0.0010 
(0.645) 
-0.0063 
(0.051) 
Loan access 0.2920 
(0.00) 
0.2416 
(0.002) 
0.4815 
(0.00) 
0.3308 
(0.00) 
0.1694 
(0.00) 
0.1155 
(0.087) 
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with public officials in purpose of facilitating innovation has been taken place, the negative 
effect on productivity and sales trend is clearly confirmed. 
Foreign ownership at level 10% to 50% in the tested firms is positively associated with 
most performance and innovation indicators, firms, innovators or non-innovators, are more likely 
to have higher levels of productivity and revenues with this level of foreign ownership than those 
more than 50% foreign owned. This result has policy implication which is the balance between 
foreign and local ownership in the firms. 
Finally, this paper examined the impact of informal finance (friends or relatives) and access 
to bank loans on performance of innovative firms, firms who rely on bank loans are more likely 
to obtain benefits in term of productivity, sales, and income from their innovation activities than 
those rely heavily on informal finance.     
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Chapter five: Conclusion and policy recommendation 
5.1 Conclusion 
Innovation is one of the most important pillars of economic growth in any country. So, 
policy makers seek to increase the growth rates of innovation activities, either by supporting 
local firms through finance, regulations, and other incentives, or through cooperation and 
partnership with foreign companies. In this paper, I studied the relationship between three crucial 
factors of business environment and diversity aspects of firm innovation for 4,993 firms across 
seven countries from East Asia and Pacific region. Firms in the sample diversified based on 
firms age, size, and legal status.  
The wide section of the data in this paper provides evidence across a variety of ﬁrms and 
countries. main results constitute that larger firms are more innovative but not necessary for 
innovator to be younger. firms classified as shareholding are more likely to invest in innovation 
activities without any preference over other legal statues in term of innovating new products and 
processes. In addition, firms located in the official capital city are more innovative. Furthermore, 
the more innovative firms are exporting ones with less than 10 competitors for the main product, 
they also compete strongly against informal sector and they have worldwide marketing networks 
with no limited to domestic and national markets.  
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The correlation between the strength of legal system and innovation has been narrowly 
examined in the literature particularly in East Asia and Pacific, I found no causal relationship 
between the degree of trust in court system and firm innovation, hence firms in these countries 
can practice innovation regardless of degree to which legal system is partial or uncorrupted. 
However, innovative firms that act in fair court system can progress satisfied levels of 
productivity and sales growth.  
This study finds that firms in East Asia and Pacific are victims of bribes and they are 
compelled to make informal payments to avoid the bureaucracy and foster their innovation 
activities, but such interacted corruption doesn’t imply that bribed innovative firms have better 
growth rate of productivity, sales, operating income, and innovation effectiveness. 
I find that local firms with 50% foreign ownership or less are more innovative, while no 
evidence that those with more than 50% are engaged in innovation activities except its role in 
obtaining international quality certificates and foreign technology licenses for local firms. state 
ownership in local firms can serve only manufacturing firms in product innovation. moreover, 
firms that are subjected to external audit services are more innovative than those are not. the 
largest owner percentage in firm ownership has no any correlation to core innovation practices. 
This study provides new evidence to the literature in term of access to external finance 
and its significant contribution in firm innovation comparing to internal finance such as retained 
earnings. But, results regarding the channels through which external finance might be the driver 
of innovation are somewhat different, I find that firms rely on external funds from non-banking 
system to finance their operation are more innovative than those who are heavily dependent on 
banks. Furthermore, firms that use informal finance such as friends or families can innovate as 
well despite the negative impact of such finance channel on their productivity and performance. 
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5.2 Policy recommendation 
The paper’s results have some policy implications, firstly, there is an urgent need to 
develop anti-corruption and bribery policies in the seven countries so as not to be an obstacle to 
firm innovation. Thus, innovators do not have to pay more informal payments to accelerate their 
innovation work. Secondly, Governments in these countries should provide adequate support to 
small businesses in terms of incentives and concessional financing through the introduction of 
distinctive financing programs that do not pose a barrier to innovation. Thirdly, due to significant 
association between international trade and innovation, policy makers need to promote the policy 
of economic globalization, openness and international trade, especially for SMEs through 
implementing programs to market their products to the international market.  
Fourthly, FDI policy makers in these countries might develop appropriate policies for 
FDI inflows so as not to acquire full ownership of local companies. Fifthly, governments need to 
develop policies for fostering innovation activities such as patents, obtaining international 
licenses for quality and technology certificates, and appropriate training programs for local 
firms’ workers particularly those production workers. Finally, influential contribution of 
governments to reduce innovation costs by determining the cost and benefit of investment in R & 
D is needed. 
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